550

Constitutional Remedies — Bivens Actions — Search and Seizure — Hernández v. Mesa

In its landmark decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Federal Bureau of Narcotics,1 the Supreme Court held that a federal agent’s violation of the Fourth Amendment gives rise to a cause of ac- tion for damages.2 In two subsequent cases, the Court extended this reasoning to violations of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause3 and the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.4 For a time, “it seemed likely that the Court would keep expanding Bivens until it became the substantial equivalent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”5 The Court soon shifted course, how- ever, and it has declined to recognize a Bivens cause of action in every subsequent case presenting the question.6 Last Term, in Hernández v. Mesa,7 the Court continued this trend by denying a Bivens claim to the parents of a Mexican teenager who was shot and killed by a Border Patrol agent.8 In doing so, the Court failed to fully grapple with the case’s similarity to Bivens, ignored the fact that the constitutional con- cerns it cited might require overruling Bivens altogether, and provided no rationale as to why damages pose a greater threat to the separation of powers than do injunctions. Hernández ultimately serves as another illustration of the Court’s failure to hold rogue government officials ac- countable for constitutional violations.

On June 7, 2010, Sergio Adrián Hernández Güereca, a fifteen-year- old Mexican citizen, was playing with his friends in the culvert that separates El Paso, Texas, from Ciudad Juárez, Mexico.9 Their game involved running up an embankment in American territory, touching a fence, and then running back down across the border.10 While they were playing, Border Patrol Agent Jesus Mesa, Jr., arrived on the scene and detained one of Hernández’s friends on the United States side of

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 1 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 2 Id. at 389. 3 Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 230 (1979). 4 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980). 5 Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1139–40 (2014). Section 1983 provides a damages cause of action for any constitutional vio- lation by an official acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 6 See Gabriella A. Orozco, Note, Bivens and Constitutional Integrity at the Border: Hernandez v. Mesa & Rodriguez v. Swartz, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 245, 255 (2019). 7 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020). 8 Id. at 740–41. 9 Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017) (per curiam). The facts recounted here are taken from the allegations in the Hernándezes’ complaint, which the Court accepted as true because the case was resolved on a motion to dismiss. Id. Some of those facts have been disputed by Mesa. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740. 10 Hernández, 137 S. Ct. at 2005.

2020] THE SUPREME COURT — LEADING CASES 551

the border.11 Hernández, who was also in American territory, ran back across the border into Mexico.12 Mesa, standing on the United States side of the border, fired at least two shots in his direction.13 One of the shots struck Hernández in the face and killed him.14 The Department of Justice investigated the shooting and concluded that Mesa had not violated Border Patrol policy.15 As a result, he did not face criminal charges or any other official sanction.16

Hernández’s parents brought a damages suit under Bivens in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleging, inter alia, that Mesa and the United States had violated Hernández’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.17 The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss.18 A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the dis- missal of the Fourth Amendment claim but held that the Fifth Amendment claim against Mesa could proceed.19 After rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of both claims, finding that Hernández was not protected by the Fourth Amendment and that Mesa was entitled to qualified immunity on the alleged Fifth Amendment vi- olation.20 The court did not address whether a Bivens remedy would have been available if the plaintiffs had stated a valid constitutional claim.21

In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.22 The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment issue was a “sensitive” one, and therefore the Fifth Circuit should “ad- dress the Bivens question in the first instance.”23 On the Fifth Amend- ment issue, the Court found that the Fifth Circuit had erred in granting qualified immunity because Hernández’s nationality and lack of ties to the United States were not known to Mesa at the time of the shooting.24

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 11 Id. 12 See id. 13 Id. 14 Id. The complaint alleged that Hernández was unarmed and posed no threat, id., while Mesa claimed that Hernández and his friends were throwing rocks at him, Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740. 15 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 740. 16 Id. Mexico requested that Mesa be extradited to face prosecution in a Mexican court, but the United States denied the request. Id. 17 Id.; Hernández v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 2d 834, 838 (W.D. Tex. 2011). 18 Hernández, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 847. 19 Hernández v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 280 (5th Cir. 2014). 20 Hernández v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per curiam). 21 See id. at 121 n.1 (Jones, J., concurring). 22 Hernández v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (2017) (per curiam). 23 Id. at 2007. 24 Id. Justice Thomas filed a dissent, arguing that the circumstances were “meaningfully differ- ent from those at issue in Bivens and its progeny” and thus Bivens should not be extended. Id. at 2008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, also dissented because he would have resolved the Fourth Amendment question in the Hernándezes’ favor and remanded for consideration of the Bivens and qualified immunity questions. Id. at 2011 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

552 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 134:410

On remand, the en banc Fifth Circuit concluded that a Bivens rem- edy was not available to the Hernándezes.25 In her majority opinion, Judge Jones26 asserted that “this is not a garden variety excessive force case.”27 Applying the two-part analysis set out in Ziglar v. Abbasi28 — which requires courts to ask (1) whether the claim arises in a “new con- text,” and, if it does, (2) whether any “special factors” counsel against the extension29 — she first held that a cross-border shooting presented a new context under Bivens due to the lack of any judicial guidance on the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution and whether it applies to foreign citizens on foreign soil.30 Moving to the second prong, Judge Jones found that several special factors counseled against the extension of Bivens.31 These included potential interference with national security,32 delicate foreign affairs matters,33 and the extraterritorial nature of the case.34 As a result, the decision to deny a Bivens remedy was “not a close [one].”35

In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed.36 Writing for the Court, Justice Alito37 first observed that Bivens, Davis v. Passman,38 and Carlson v. Green39 were decided in “an era when the Court routinely inferred ‘causes of action.’”40 Eventually, however, the Court “came to ap- preciate more fully the tension between this practice and the Constitution’s separation of legislative and judicial power.”41 Since Congress, in the Court’s view, is best positioned to determine whether liability should be imposed on federal officials for constitutional torts, the expansion of Bivens is now a “‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”42

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 25 Hernández v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc). 26 Judge Jones was joined by Chief Judge Stewart and Judges Jolly, Davis, Smith, Clement, Owen, Elrod, Southwick, Higginson, and Costa. Judge Dennis concurred in the judgment, while Judge Haynes concurred in the judgment and with the conclusion that Bivens should not extend to the facts of the case. 27 Hernández, 885 F.3d at 814. 28 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017). 29 See id. at 1859–60. 30 Hernández, 885 F.3d at 815–17. 31 Id. at 818. 32 Id. 33 Id. at 819. 34 Id. at 821. 35 Id. at 823. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Prado, joined by Judge Graves, agreed that the case presented a new context. Id. at 824 (Prado, J., dissenting). With respect to the special factors inquiry, however, he described the “empty labels of national security, foreign affairs, and extrater- ritoriality” as “all hat, no cattle.” Id. at 825. 36 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 750. 37 Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. 38 442 U.S. 228 (1979). 39 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 40 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 741 (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017)). 41 Id. 42 Id. at 742 (quoting Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857).

2020] THE SUPREME COURT — LEADING CASES 553

Justice Alito then turned to the two-step inquiry the Court employs when asked to extend Bivens.43 First, he concluded that the petitioners’ claims arose in a new context.44 Although Bivens and Davis were also brought under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, respectively, Justice Alito observed that “[a] claim may arise in a new context even if it is based on the same constitutional provision as a claim in a case in which a damages remedy was previously recognized.”45 The cross-border shooting in Hernández was “meaningfully different”46 from both Bivens, which involved an arrest and search in New York City, and Davis, which involved charges of sex discrimination against a member of Congress.47 Since these circumstances presented a new context, Justice Alito moved to the special factors inquiry.48

On the second prong of the analysis, multiple special factors coun- seled against extending Bivens.49 Justice Alito first noted that the Court must be especially cautious before allowing a Bivens remedy that in- trudes on the political branches’ responsibility for foreign relations.50 In addition, the potential Bivens claims implicated national security issues because Border Patrol agents are responsible for preventing the illegal entry of people and goods into the United States.51 Finally, he cited multiple statutes in which Congress declined to authorize damages claims for injuries suffered outside the United States,52 concluding that “[t]his pattern of congressional action . . . gives us further reason to hes- itate about extending Bivens in this case.”53

Ultimately, Justice Alito stated, all of these special factors centered around one concern: “respect for the separation of powers.”54 In his view, courts are not well equipped to make decisions that implicate for- eign policy and national security, and these institutional capacity con- cerns are “heightened” when it comes to judicially created constitutional remedies.55 As a result, the Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s finding that the Hernándezes had no cause of action under Bivens.56

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 43 Id. at 743. 44 Id. 45 Id. 46 Id. at 743–44. 47 Id. at 744. 48 Id. 49 Id. 50 Id. 51 Id. at 746. 52 Justice Alito pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991. See id. at 747–49. 53 Id. at 749. 54 Id. 55 Id. 56 Id. at 750.

554 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 134:410

Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.57 While he agreed with the majority’s conclusion that Bivens should not be extended to cross- border shootings, he wrote separately to suggest that the Court discard Bivens altogether.58 As he pointed out, the Court has already weakened the underpinnings of Bivens by repeatedly refusing to extend it.59 In his view, “we have already repudiated the foundation of the Bivens doc- trine; nothing is left to do but overrule it.”60 Allowing Bivens to survive in even a limited form, Justice Thomas argued, would pose serious sep- aration of powers concerns.61 He thus would have gone further than the majority and explicitly abandoned the doctrine.62

Justice Ginsburg dissented.63 First, she disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the case presented a new context — to the contrary, it arose “in a setting kin to Bivens itself.”64 According to Justice Ginsburg, Abbasi made it clear that plaintiffs may bring Bivens claims for seizures that violate the Fourth Amendment, and using lethal force against some- one “who ‘poses no immediate threat . . . ’ surely qualifies as an unrea- sonable seizure.”65 Furthermore, she argued that where Hernández was standing when Mesa shot him was irrelevant because “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter the officer” — and the officer was standing in the United States.66

Even if the case presented a new context, Justice Ginsburg also dis- agreed with the majority’s special factors analysis. With respect to for- eign relations, she observed that courts frequently adjudicate cases in- volving smuggling and other illicit activities at the border even while diplomatic negotiations are ongoing.67 In addition, she criticized the majority for speaking in general terms about national security while failing to explain precisely how a Bivens suit here would undermine border safety.68 Justice Ginsburg concluded by noting that Hernández’s death was “not an isolated incident” of alleged misconduct by Border Patrol agents.69 This misconduct, however, rarely results in prosecution

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 57 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas was joined by Justice Gorsuch. 58 Id. 59 Id. at 752. 60 Id. 61 Id. (describing adherence to Bivens as a “usurpation of legislative power”). 62 Id. at 753. 63 Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 64 Id. at 756. 65 Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985)). 66 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017)). Justice Ginsburg also pointed out that Hernández’s parents would have had a Bivens claim if he had been standing in the United States when he was shot, as Mesa’s counsel conceded at oral argument. Id. 67 Id. at 758. 68 See id. 69 Id. at 759.

2020] THE SUPREME COURT — LEADING CASES 555

or official disciplinary measures.70 As she wrote, “it is all too apparent that to redress injuries like the one suffered here, it is Bivens or noth- ing. . . . I resist the conclusion that ‘nothing’ is the answer required in this case.”71

It has been forty years since the Supreme Court last recognized the existence of a new Bivens cause of action.72 Hernández continued that trend, but the Court’s reasoning fell short in several respects. For one, the majority failed to give adequate attention to the significant factual similarities between Hernández and Bivens. In addition, the Court re- lied heavily on constitutional concerns about the separation of powers, but it did not explain whether those concerns would be dispositive in a case with the same facts as Bivens. And the Court did not provide any justification as to why judicially created causes of action for damages are more threatening to the separation of powers than are judicially im- posed injunctions. While congressional intervention to reinvigorate Bivens is still possible, Hernández continued the Court’s pattern of fail- ing to provide meaningful oversight of rogue government actors.

In light of the Court’s refusal to extend Bivens in the years since Carlson, commentators have frequently described the doctrine as dead or significantly weakened.73 Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Abbasi, how- ever, provided at least some glimmer of hope that Bivens might retain its force with respect to Fourth Amendment violations. He explicitly stated that the decision was “not intended to cast doubt on the continued force, or even the necessity, of Bivens in the search-and-seizure context

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 70 See id. at 760. 71 Id. 72 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17–18 (1980). In the years since Carlson, the Court has rejected a cause of action under Bivens at least nine times. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1869 (2017); Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 120 (2012); Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 547–49 (2007); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 414 (1988); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683– 84 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304–05 (1983); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983). 73 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2006–2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 26 (“[After Robbins,] the best that can be said of the Bivens doctrine is that it is on life support with little prospect of recovery.”); Stephen I. Vladeck, National Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255, 257 (2010) (observing that the “consensus view” regarded Iqbal as “an unremarkable addition to a long line of Supreme Court decisions over the past quarter-century in which the Court has effec- tively limited Bivens to its facts”); Michael Dorf, SCOTUS Severely Narrows Civil Rights Suits Against Federal Officers, DORF ON LAW (June 19, 2017), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/06/scotus- severely-narrows-civil-rights.html [https://perma.cc/3RZK-SM3H] (asserting that the decision in Abbasi “all but overrules Bivens”). Hernández was no exception to this trend. See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court Just Held that a Border Guard Who Shot a Child Will Face No Consequences, VOX (Feb. 25, 2020, 12:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/25/21152643/supreme- court-hernandez-mesa-bivens-border-guard-cross-mexico [https://perma.cc/GE3A-8RDA] (“Bivens is probably in its final days.”).

556 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 134:410

in which it arose.”74 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Abbasi plaintiffs were challenging “large-scale policy decisions.”75 Un- like the plaintiffs in Bivens and Davis, they were not attacking “indi- vidual instances of discrimination or law enforcement overreach, which . . . are difficult to address except by way of damages actions af- ter the fact.”76 Even after Abbasi, then, it seemed that — at least for Fourth Amendment violations — there might be room for Bivens to survive outside of its original facts.77

Instead, the Court failed to grapple with the fact that Hernández involved a situation similar to the one Abbasi seemed to contemplate: a single rogue agent, not acting in conformity with any official policy,78 executed an unlawful seizure.79 As then-Judge Kavanaugh put it just a few years earlier, “[t]he classic Bivens case entails a suit alleging an un- reasonable search or seizure by a federal officer in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”80 Of course, Hernández differed from Bivens in- sofar as it implicated the border, but lower courts had previously con- sidered similar claims to be viable.81 And as Justice Ginsburg pointed out, Hernández — unlike Abbasi — did not differ from Bivens with respect to the “rank of the officers involved; the constitutional right at

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 74 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856; see also id. at 1857 (“The settled law of Bivens in this common and recurrent sphere of law enforcement, and the undoubted reliance upon it as a fixed principle in the law, are powerful reasons to retain it in that sphere.”). 75 Id. at 1862. 76 Id. 77 See Orozco, supra note 6, at 281–83 (suggesting that recognizing a Bivens action for cross- border shootings would be consistent with Abbasi); see also Hernández v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 826 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Prado, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hernández presented “the limited cir- cumstances in which Abbasi indicated a Bivens remedy would exist”). 78 See 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(a)(2)(ii) (2020) (permitting immigration officers to use deadly force only when they have “reasonable grounds to believe that such force is necessary to protect [themselves] or other persons from the imminent danger of death or serious physical injury”). 79 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (“A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”). 80 Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 429 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 81 See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 727, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (upholding a Bivens claim for the mother of a Mexican teenager who was shot and killed while walking down a street in Mexico by a Border Patrol agent standing in Arizona), judgment vacated, 140 S. Ct. 1258 (2020). Until 1988, plaintiffs such as Rodriguez and the Hernándezes might have been able to bring common law tort suits, see SCOTT MICHELMAN, CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT 102 (2020), and in fact the Hernándezes would have likely had a claim under Texas law, see Brief for the Petitioners at 19, Hernández, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL 3714475 (citing Delgado v. Zaragoza, 267 F. Supp. 3d 892, 898 (W.D. Tex. 2016)). The passage of the Westfall Act, however, “raise[d] the stakes” of denying Bivens actions because it immunized federal officers from state tort claims, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933, 989 (2019), thereby leaving some of these plaintiffs in an even worse position than they would have been in before Bivens was decided, cf. William Baude, Bivens Liability and Its Alternatives, SUMMARY, JUDGMENT (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.summarycommajudgment.com/blog/a-few-thoughts- about-bivens-liability [https://perma.cc/9JBZ-2TUE] (“[I]f the Court is going to abolish the 20th cen- tury remedies for unconstitutional conduct, can we at least have the 19th century remedies back?”).

2020] THE SUPREME COURT — LEADING CASES 557

issue; the generality or specificity of the official action; the extent of ju- dicial guidance as to how an officer should respond to the problem or emergency to be confronted; [or] the statutory . . . mandate under which the officer was operating.”82 With all of these similarities, one might have expected the Court to provide more than just a few sentences of conclusory analysis stating that the presence of a new context was “glar- ingly obvious.”83

Furthermore, while relying so heavily on separation of powers con- cerns,84 the Court failed to acknowledge that such considerations were also present in Bivens itself.85 While those concerns are arguably more pronounced in Hernández because of the border context,86 the Court also criticized the constitutional implications of Bivens claims more gen- erally.87 But if Bivens actions really pose such a grave threat to the separation of powers, then it seems the Court should have overruled the doctrine altogether rather than just hollowing it out further. Justice Thomas’s concurrence suggested as much, asserting that “adherence to even a limited form of the Bivens doctrine appears to ‘perpetuat[e] a usurpation of the legislative power.’”88 Instead, the three Justices who declined to extend Bivens but would not entirely abandon it planted

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 82 Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 756 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017)). 83 Id. at 743 (majority opinion). The Court’s decision is especially problematic because com- plaints against Border Patrol agents are common, and damages suits provide perhaps the only meaningful avenue to deter future misconduct. See id. at 759–60 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Former Officials of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency in Support of Petitioners at 35, Hernández, 140 S. Ct. 735 (2020) (No. 17-1678), 2019 WL 3854465 (“[T]he prospect of civil liability plays a proper and important role in deterring Border Patrol officers from using excessive force in confrontations with individuals at and across the border.”). According to one report, over 800 complaints alleging physical, verbal, or sexual abuse were made against Border Patrol agents between 2009 and 2012. See Hernández, 140 S. Ct. at 760 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing DANIEL E. MARTÍNEZ, GUILLERMO …

500

Fourth Amendment — Search and Seizure — Reasonable Suspicion — Kansas v. Glover

The Supreme Court once considered “reasonable suspicion” to be

“one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment.”1 Yet this ostensibly simple concept has eluded lower courts ever since Terry v. Ohio.2 Last Term, in Kansas v. Glover,3 the Supreme Court held that a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle after he learned that the owner of the vehicle had a revoked license.4 The Court based its holding on common sense and discussed empirical evidence only in dicta. In so doing, the Court con- fused — rather than clarified — the ongoing debate about the role of empirical analysis in reasonable suspicion determinations. In the mean- time, it offered lower courts no alternative method for judging the “com- mon sense” of an officer’s inference under similar facts.

While on patrol in April 2016, Deputy Mark Mehrer ran the license plate number of a 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck through the Kansas Department of Revenue database.5 He learned that the vehicle’s regis- tered owner, Charles Glover, Jr., had a revoked driver’s license.6 Deputy Mehrer initiated a traffic stop, assuming that Glover was driving the truck, even though he did not observe the driver commit any traffic violation or try to confirm the driver’s identity.7

Glover was indeed the driver and was charged with driving as a habitual violator — driving repeatedly without a valid license.8 Glover moved to suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop.9 Instead of testifying at the hearing, the parties entered into a brief seven- paragraph stipulation of facts.10 The trial court granted Glover’s motion to suppress because Deputy Mehrer did not have reasonable sus- picion to stop his truck.11 The Kansas Court of Appeals reversed, hold- ing that Deputy Mehrer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop because he “kn[ew] the registered owner of the vehicle ha[d] a sus- pended license&#x2

Our website has a team of professional writers who can help you write any of your homework. They will write your papers from scratch. We also have a team of editors just to make sure all papers are of HIGH QUALITY & PLAGIARISM FREE. To make an Order you only need to click Ask A Question and we will direct you to our Order Page at WriteDemy. Then fill Our Order Form with all your assignment instructions. Select your deadline and pay for your paper. You will get it few hours before your set deadline.

Fill in all the assignment paper details that are required in the order form with the standard information being the page count, deadline, academic level and type of paper. It is advisable to have this information at hand so that you can quickly fill in the necessary information needed in the form for the essay writer to be immediately assigned to your writing project. Make payment for the custom essay order to enable us to assign a suitable writer to your order. Payments are made through Paypal on a secured billing page. Finally, sit back and relax.

Do you need an answer to this or any other questions?

Order Plagiarism Free Answer Here

About Wridemy

We are a professional paper writing website. If you have searched a question and bumped into our website just know you are in the right place to get help in your coursework. We offer HIGH QUALITY & PLAGIARISM FREE Papers.

How It Works

To make an Order you only need to click on “Order Now” and we will direct you to our Order Page. Fill Our Order Form with all your assignment instructions. Select your deadline and pay for your paper. You will get it few hours before your set deadline.

Are there Discounts?

All new clients are eligible for 20% off in their first Order. Our payment method is safe and secure.

Hire a tutor today CLICK HERE to make your first order

Related Tags

Academic APA Writing College Course Discussion Management English Finance General Graduate History Information Justify Literature MLA