When Does Cooperation Improve Public Policy Implementation?

Martin Lundin

Interorganizational cooperation is often considered valuable in the public sector. However, in this article it is suggested that the impact of cooperation on public policy implementation is dependent on the type of policy being carried out. It is argued that complex policies are more effectively put into practice if agencies cooperate a lot, whereas less difficult tasks are handled just as well without interorganizational cooperation. Thus, two policies within the Swedish active labor market policy are examined. The empirical test focuses on the cooperation between Public Employment Service offices and municipal labor market administrations. In agreement with the hypothesis, the findings suggest that policy matters. The implementation of one of the policies—the complex policy—is enhanced if cooperation between agencies increase. On the other hand, cooperation does not improve implementa- tion of the less complex task. The study is based on quantitative data.

KEY WORDS: implementation, interorganizational cooperation, policy, active labor market policy, Sweden

Relationships between authorities impinge on policy implementation (O’Toole, 2003) and it is often emphasized that public policy can be carried out better if cooperation increases among agencies. Some scholars claim that interorganizational cooperation is inherently good (e.g., Hudson, Hardy, Henwood, & Wistow, 1999; Jones, Thomas, & Rudd, 2004), although empirical evidence suggests that coopera- tion only sometimes enhances performance (Jennings & Ewalt, 1998). The purpose of this article is to enrich our understanding of policy implementation by examining when a cooperative strategy actually makes implementation output better. More precisely, it is argued that the effects of cooperation vary with the complexity of the policy carried out.

An agency that cooperates with others can make use of additional resources, such as expertise and information. Activities can hopefully also be better co- ordinated. This suggests that interorganizational cooperation improves an agency’s ability to put policy into practice. On the other hand, it is difficult to work across organizational boundaries. For example, the collaborating authorities have to devote a lot of time and other resources to establishing and maintaining a productive relationship. Thus, we cannot be sure that cooperation improves implementation in

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every situation. In this article, it is suggested that task complexity is a key factor that explains why the effect of cooperation on implementation output will be greater in certain situations. Basically, the benefits of cooperation are likely to more than offset the costs if the task is complex. In contrast, when the policy is not complex co- operation adds very little value, but still involves some costs. To my knowledge, this idea has previously not been thoroughly discussed and empirically evaluated in implementation research.

The empirical focus is relations between different units of government. More precisely, the analysis concerns Public Employment Service (PES) offices and their relationship to local governments (municipalities) in the Swedish active labor market policy (ALMP). The PES is the main local labor market actor. But in recent years, municipalities have become an increasingly important factor (Lundin & Skedinger, 2006; Salonen & Ulmestig, 2004). The Swedish government encourages cooperation between these actors. But will implementation of labor market activities actually be improved if the PES cooperates a lot with the municipality? Is it possible to anticipate a positive effect on a broad range of policies, or is it only certain labor market activities that are affected positively?

Two policies are examined. One of the policies—activities for unemployed youth—is not that complex. The other—activities for individuals with especially long spells of unemployment—is more intricate. Thus, I expect cooperation to be a more efficient strategy in the latter case. The quantitative analysis is based on recent data consisting of information from several sources. The findings indicate that coopera- tion improves the implementation of activities for individuals unemployed for an especially long time. On the other hand, cooperation does not enhance the imple- mentation of the youth policy. This indicates that complex tasks can be carried out better if a cooperative approach is employed, but that it is not reasonable to assume that interorganizational cooperation will always have a positive impact on how policies are implemented.

The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, the theoretical discourse is outlined. An introduction of the research setting comes next, followed by a section that discusses methodological issues and measures. Empirical findings are reported. I conclude by summing up the results and discussing their possible implications.

Implementation and Interorganizational Cooperation

Local practices are not always the same as the intentions stated in official docu- ments endorsed by politicians. In addition, performance frequently varies from one local context to another. As a result, it is wise not to assume that the study of statutes, government bills, and regulations will be enough to understand what political deci- sions imply “in the real world.”1

An implementation problem occurs when a political decision is not carried out in accordance with what the decision maker wants. We assume that local practice should be in line with the elected officials’ intentions, that is, agents should follow the principal’s instructions. This perspective is easy to endorse, based on normative democratic theory. In a modern democracy, citizens freely elect representatives who

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can be held to account at the ballot box. Politicians cannot implement a policy all by themselves; they have to rely on a civil service to do this. But the citizens cannot replace the bureaucracy by casting their vote. Consequently, a prerequisite for satis- factory democracy is that politicians control and govern a civil service that respects their decisions (Sannerstedt, 2001).

There are arguments in favor of another point of view, which argues that the local civil service is more receptive to local desires and needs. Discrepancies between a decision and its implementation might therefore in practice mean a “better” policy and a greater responsiveness to citizens’ wishes. Depending on which normative starting point is assumed, variation in—or insufficient—implementation perfor- mance is thus not always necessarily a disadvantage (deLeon, 1999). Nonetheless, most scholars would concur that it is troublesome if there is a gap between the law and practice (Keiser & Soss, 1998). In this article, I focus on the top-down aspect of implementation, that is, implementation as compliance. It is, however, necessary to acknowledge that other angles of approach are just as relevant in implementation research.

Certain political decisions are quite easy to carry out and can be managed almost exclusively by a unitary public administration. A change in a tax rate or the level of a general welfare benefit is virtually self-implemented. But implementation is normally more complicated and involves several participants. Hence, an important component in almost every contemporary framework explaining implementation success and failure has to do with how interorganizational relationships are managed (e.g., Bardach, 1998; Goggin, Bowman, Lester, & O’Toole, 1990; Hjern & Porter, 1981; O’Toole, 2003; O’Toole & Montjoy, 1984; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984; Winter, 2003a).

An agency assigned the task of carrying out a political decision may use different techniques to implement a policy. For instance, the agency may try to cooperate as much as possible with other organizations. Cooperation (collaboration)—that is, all the interactions among organizations aimed at solving public problems by working together (cf. Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995)—is one of the golden words in public- sector management. Through partnerships and other collaborative endeavors, public- sector performance is often considered to be improved. All else being equal, one would expect a public agency with access to significant resources to carry out a policy or program better than an agency which lacks resources (e.g., Keiser & Soss, 1998; Meier & McFarlane, 1996). Organizations possess resources. An agency carrying out a political decision may thus enhance its own capacity by collaborating with other organizations (e.g., Jennings, 1994). The surrounding organizations may contribute with information, and they could have staff, knowledge, money, and premises, making the business of putting ideas into practice easier. Cooperation can also mean that resource-consuming and conflicting activities that may result in socially perverse outcomes are avoided (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Thus, it is easy to see why inter- organizational cooperation is often assumed to improve implementation.

But there are a number of prerequisites. First, the potential partner must have additional resources that can be of use to the focal agency. Second, the partner must be willing to share resources. Third, there are always costs associated with

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collaboration (e.g., Schermerhorn, 1975; Van de Ven, 1976; Weiss, 1987). Although a potential partner is willing to share valuable resources with the focal agency, coop- eration may be a complicated process. To at least some extent, all organizations have different agendas and various routines to handle things. As a consequence, interor- ganizational cooperation may be a complicated process involving bargaining, and therefore call for considerable time and other resources on the part of the agents concerned. Another cost to be considered is that the principal’s objectives—for example, central government intentions—may be put on one side when the local agents concerned are trying to reach their best joint solution. In other words, instead of pursuing central government directives, local actors may work for other goals they can agree on. In sum, the costs of cooperating might well outweigh the benefits and we should not assume that more cooperation implies that political intentions are always realized to a greater extent.

Cooperation can, of course, have important implications for other aspects than implementation output. For instance, a public program might become more effective if authorities cooperate, even if implementation is not enhanced.2 Cooperation might also imply that a decision becomes more legitimate in the eyes of the target group for a certain policy. But this study is limited to the question of how to make a political decision come true in accordance with officials’ intentions.

Jennings and Ewalt (1998) note that there is only anecdotal evidence that coordination—which in practice is measured as the level of cooperation—actually improves public services. Jennings and Ewalt examine the accomplishment of policy goals in employment and training services in the United States. In a prior article, Jennings (1994) indicated positive effects of coordination on the administrators’ subjective perceptions of performance. But in the study from 1998, objective outcome measures were employed as dependent variables. The analysis shows that coordination has a limited positive effect; most of the indicators were unaffected by the level of coordination. The findings suggest that although interorganizational cooperation may sometimes be a good strategy, we cannot expect it always to improve performance. There is some indication that there is a positive effect in the long run, but the evidence is not decisive. On the other hand, Hudson et al. (1999, p. 238) note that “while recognizing that there are other positions, this article takes the normative position that collaboration is generally a ‘good thing’—a stance which is consistent with the rather long history of collaboration in organization theory and public administration.” In many ways this is certainly true, but if we want to under- stand public administration and public policy implementation it must be better to improve theory on what the balance of benefits and costs would look like in various situations. This can tell us when cooperation actually is a good strategy.

There seems to be a lack of research on these matters. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) suggest that the number of actors involved in an interorganizational setting determines whether implementation will be successful; more actors mean greater probability of failure. O’Toole and Montjoy (1984) refine this argument and hold that a large number of actors makes implementation worse in cases of reciprocal inter- dependence (when actors poses contingencies for each other) and in sequential interdependence (when the output of one actor is the input of another). Contrarily,

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in cases of pooled interdependence (when actors contribute to a task without dealing with each other) and in sequential competitive interdependence (when there are actors competing to do the same thing in the implementation process) a larger number of actors improves policy output. These scholars focus on the effects of the organizational setting per se, not the extent to which actors work together, which is the focus in this article. The question here is rather whether a lot of cooperation generates a better payoff, given certain tasks. More specifically, is a high degree of cooperation especially rewarding for certain policy types?

The discussion is restricted to one policy dimension that deserves particular attention: task complexity. Task complexity is defined as the product of the scope of actions and the intensity required to carry out a policy. By scope I mean the extent to which many areas of expertise are required to fulfill the goals or, put another way, “the degree to which tasks are variable and require a multidisciplinary or multidi- mensional approach” (Alter & Hage, 1993, p. 117). Intensity is a matter of how much work has to be done in order to realize ambitions; a task that requires many man- hours on the part of an agency is considered intense. A possible objection is that complexity is only about the scope. However, I think that we should consider intensity as well because the problems that a policy which has a great scope implies are multiplied if intense actions also are required. Thus, in this article a policy that has large scope and involves intense actions is considered complex. In research on interfirm partnerships, it is quite common to talk about joint task complexity as a function of the scope and depth (intensity) of interactions between firms (White, 2005). This definition parallels the one used in the present study. Most organization theory scholars define complexity in a related vein, although there are alternatives on the same theme (see, e.g., Alter & Hage, 1993, pp. 116–22).

Task complexity is an incentive for cooperation (cf. Alter & Hage, 1993). A need for external resources boosts interorganizational cooperation (e.g., Van de Ven & Walker, 1984; Weiss, 1987) and complex tasks may demand resources that cannot be found within a single agency. In this perspective, actors cooperate when cooperation is needed, otherwise they do not. But the extent of cooperation between two agen- cies, A and B, is certainly not only a direct function of the task complexity of policy X that A implements. Cooperation is a consequence of the agencies’ perceived total value of working together, which may be something rather different from the actual value that cooperation adds to the task of realizing policy X in accordance with official intentions. First, the agencies do not have perfect information and cannot take in all benefits and costs of cooperation: A does not know exactly what greater value cooperation actually implies. Second, A cannot set cooperation precisely at the optimal level on its own. If B does not want cooperation to increase, A cannot do much about this. Third, the incentives and disincentives for A to cooperate with B are numerous.3 External pressure for cooperation is one example. Political representa- tives or other bureaucratic levels may exhort A to collaborate with B. In some cases, a legal mandate may require A to cooperate with B. Norms and values in both organizations are other things that determine cooperation. Moreover, working together with B can make it easier for A to accomplish other goals than those related to policy X. Accordingly, although the net benefit of cooperation for A can be

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positive, this does not mean that policy X becomes better implemented. In sum, it is too restrictive to assume that task complexity impinges only on cooperation levels. It can also tell us something about the effect on policy output. Whereas the other factors mentioned above affect cooperation, it is only the cost–benefit analysis related to the policy being implemented that determines the effect on implementation in the specific case.

So the question is now why we should assume that the effect of cooperation would be greater as policy complexity increases. In a less complex policy, it is likely that the benefits of cooperation would be quite low. In these situations, the agency’s capacity is not going to increase that much by using other organizations’ resources because the most important resources are already available within the agency. Organizations are formed to perform certain tasks and in a less complex policy the most important resources are already available. This means that increasing levels of cooperation do not add that much value. As complexity rises, cooperation provides more benefits. The agency needs more expertise, information, money, premises, and so on. Through cooperation these resources can be attained.

The costs must also be considered. As complexity increases, the costs of coop- eration are also likely to increase. For instance, the risk of disputes and impediments becomes greater. But while the benefits of cooperation are very low given little complexity, there will always be costs. In fact, many costs are independent of the level of complexity. Cooperation is a dynamic process and decisions and activities within a policy are not independent of each other. Given that actors agree on some basic things, the additional problems that arise with increasing complexity will not be that high. In another context—interfirm alliances—White (2005) considers the costs asso- ciated with cooperation. Even though he claims that costs are higher given a complex task, he repeatedly notes that the benefits are often likely to be even greater. He claims that “additional costs of a more complex interface may be more than offset by the benefits possible from more extensive interaction” (p. 1388) and if the partners have relatively similar objectives and values, “the additional marginal cooperation costs resulting from greater scope or depth-related coordination costs should be more than offset by increased benefits” (p. 1395).

In sum, it seems likely that in a situation characterized by low task complexity there will be very little (or no) benefit from cooperation, but some costs. These costs increase somewhat as complexity increases, but the increase will be lower than the increase in benefits. If complexity is high, the large benefits will prevail over the costs. Cooperation is therefore a more value-adding activity given complex tasks. Accordingly, we should expect the effect of cooperation on policy output to be greater given complex tasks. These arguments are perhaps not brand new, but to my knowledge they have not been discussed and evaluated empirically in the context of local policy implementation.

Intergovernmental Cooperation in Swedish Active Labor Market Policy

To discern whether complexity is an important variable, we need to know the effects of cooperation on the implementation of at least two policies: one complex

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task and another less complex task. Swedish ALMP provides rather good opportu- nities to examine this. Unemployment is a huge problem in most OECD countries (Martin & Grubb, 2001). Job brokering activities and labor market programs are examples of ALMPs a government can use to reduce these problems. In Sweden, the National Labor Market Administration (Arbetsmarknadsverket) implements ALMPs. Local PES offices (Arbetsförmedlingar) carry out most of the programs in practice. There is a PES in nearly all cities, and in larger cities there is usually more than one office.

Although the National Labor Market Administration is clearly the most impor- tant authority managing ALMPs in Sweden, other actors are involved. One feature in recent years has been more involvement on the part of local governments in the implementation of ALMPs (e.g., Lundin, 2007; Lundin & Skedinger, 2006; Salonen & Ulmestig, 2004). The municipalities take an active part by, for example, organizing labor market programs. About 40 percent of the clients involved in programs admin- istered by the National Labor Market Administration are participating in activities in which the municipalities are involved (Lundin & Skedinger, 2006). A lot of the municipal activities are targeted at social welfare benefit recipients (Salonen & Ulmestig, 2004) and at unemployed youth (Carling & Larsson, 2005). The content of the activities varies, but job-search assistance and work practice are quite common.

The municipalities have a premier position within the Swedish political system. For example, they have the constitutional right of self-government; they are comparably large; they can decide on their own organization; and their incomes come mostly from a proportional income tax they can set freely (see, e.g., Bäck, 2003; Gustafsson, 1999). The municipalities provide most of the services of the Swedish welfare state. For instance, they supply day care, care of the elderly, social welfare services, introduction of immigrants into Swedish society, and primary education. Several of these policy areas—the most obvious example being social welfare services—clearly intertwine with ALMPs. This suggests that collaboration with the municipality could be beneficial for the PES.

In the analysis, effects of cooperation between the PES and the municipality on implementation of ALMPs are studied. The study concerns two policies. One of the policies is more complex. The positive effect of cooperation is anticipated to be greater in this policy.

In August 2000, the Swedish government launched a new labor market program called the Activity Guarantee (Aktivitetsgarantin). The target group was individuals who had been unemployed for a considerable time period. By means of intense job-search assistance and close monitoring, persons who were, or who risked being, long-term unemployed were to be given a place in the program. All traditional ALMPs could be used within the Activity Guarantee. Accordingly, the content of the activities varies to a large extent. The political ambition was that jobseekers should be enrolled in the program after 27 months of unbroken PES registration, at the latest. What distinguishes the Activity Guarantee from other labor market programs is its intensity. All activities are assumed to be full-time activities and the participants should meet their personal PES supervisor on a regular basis, and more frequently than before they entered the program. Since the persons participating in the

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guarantee are “hard cases” and often have multiple problems, the government calls for intense treatment and encourages PES offices to collaborate with other local actors. The local governments are, in practice, the PES offices’ most common coop- eration partners (Forslund, Fröberg, & Lindqvist, 2004).

In 1994, the Swedish government declared that no young person should remain unemployed for more than 100 days. The government regarded long-term unem- ployment as devastating for future labor market prospects. Young people are defined as long-term unemployed if they are unemployed for more than 100 days. Thus, the ambition was that every individual of below 25 years of age should be offered a labor market program if they were unable to find a job within three months of registration at the local PES. The central government encouraged the municipalities to take part in actions to reduce long-term unemployment among young people in different ways. For instance, in 1995 the government introduced the Municipal Youth Program (Kommunala ungdomsprogrammet) and three years later the UVG-guarantee (Ung- domsgarantin). The PES offices are expected to collaborate with local governments in both programs (Carling & Larsson, 2005).

Recall that task complexity is defined in terms of the scope and intensity of a policy. The Activity Guarantee is more intense and has greater scope than the youth policy. Thus, it is a good representative of a complex policy (and this applies even if complexity is defined only in terms of the scope). First, consider the client groups. In the Activity Guarantee, the clients are comparatively old and they are obviously not particularly attractive on the labor market because they have been looking for a job for such a long time. It is also reasonable to assume that a relatively large part of the clients have multiple problems because the program is directed at those with the weakest position on the labor market. In comparison, youth clients have not been unemployed for such a long time. Consequently, they are probably more motivated, more homogenous, and easier to handle. Accordingly, the treatment of clients in the Activity Guarantee needs more areas of expertise and more intense activities.

Second, although various youth activities are probably not so simple to imple- ment, the Activity Guarantee is more complex. The activities are supposed to be rigorous and carried out in small groups. Contacts between clients and personal supervisor are also expected to be more frequent than is generally the case. In short, these activities are more intense. Moreover, the government’s intention was that the program should be flexible and contain various activities suited for the individual client. This means that the Activity Guarantee is intended to have greater scope than other ALMPs. On balance, it is safe to conclude that the Activity Guarantee is much more complex than the youth policy, even though some youth activities can also be said to contain complexities. Thus, I predict a greater effect of cooperation on imple- mentation output in the Activity Guarantee.

The selected research setting is suitable for several reasons. First, unemployment is a large societal problem and a lot of resources are allocated to diminishing the unemployment rate all around world. Studies that can bring some clarity to what is going on when ALMPs are put into practice are therefore important. Second, this study is focused on the relationships between the same types of actors who imple- ment the same policies around Sweden. This implies that features of the agencies and

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the policies that do not vary can be held constant. From a methodological point of view this is very beneficial. Third, Swedish ALMPs can be seen as a “critical case,” meaning that here, if anywhere, we ought to expect that cooperation will improve implementation on a broad range of activities. O’Toole (1983) claims that there are very high information and expertise requirements in ALMPs. Interorganizational cooperation is therefore likely to be a good strategy for gathering the necessary resources. Furthermore, there are obvious connections between the responsibilities of the PES offices and the municipalities. This means that we have good reasons for believing that cooperation is a good strategy when it comes to both policies.

Method and Measures

Whereas quantitative approaches have become increasingly common and more sophisticated in the implementation literature from the United States (e.g., Brehm & Gates, 1997; Daley & Layton, 2004; Meier & McFarlane, 1996), studies based on large-N data in the European context are rare. This study is based on European quantitative data and is therefore a significant contribution.4 The PES offices are the unit of analysis and cross-section data covering 2003 is used. Questionnaires were distributed to the chief managers of all PES offices in February 2004: 268 managers answered the questionnaire, which implies a response rate of 75 percent. An analysis of the nonresponses showed no noticeable difference between respondents and nonrespondents on background characteristics. Register data from the National Labor Market Administration supplement the survey. Lastly, official statistics, in …

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Facts and Myths about Research on Public Policy Implementation: Out-of-Fashion, Allegedly Dead, But Still Very Much Alive and Relevant

Harald Saetren

Despite several decades of research on public policy implementation we know surprisingly little, not only about cumulative research results, but also about several other key aspects of this research field. This article tries to amend these deficiencies by presenting the results of a comprehensive literature survey. Its main purpose is to challenge, revise, and supplement some conventional wisdom about implementation research. A second motivation is to lay the foundation for and initiate a much needed synthesis of empirical research results. The main results are: The overall volume of publications on policy implementation has not stagnated or declined dramatically since the mid 1980s as is commonly asserted. On the contrary, it has continued to grow exponentially through the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. Even more surprising is that a large number of publications are located outside the core fields. Hence, the literature is substantially larger and more multidisciplinary than most com- mentators realize. Doctoral dissertations are the most ignored, but probably the richest, largest, and best source of empirical research results. Tracing the origin as well as the location of the disciplinary and geographical cradle of implementation studies must also be readjusted significantly. The ethno- centric bias of this research field toward the Western hemisphere has been, and still is, strong and some policy sectors are given much more attention than others. Although positive in many ways, the pre- dominant multidisciplinary character of implementation research still poses some serious problems with respect to theory development. Thus, I discuss whether a resurgence of interest in policy imple- menta

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