08 Apr I’m representing Gabon, and I have attached my country position and some other countries positions such as France and US -there are two examples too- ?see CW1 fillCritical_Refle
I'm representing Gabon, and I have attached my country position and some other countries positions such as France and US
-there are two examples too-
see CW1 fill
Critical Reflection:
UNSC Simulation for Fragile States
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) simulation that took place on the 19th
of March 2021 was an informative and powerful opportunity to better understand the
functioning of such events in the United Nations. The participants of this module split into
groups by various countries; of which some were permanent and others non permanent
members of the security council to discuss the topic of fragile states. The countries presented
position papers beforehand, and throughout the simulation we discussed various resolutions
and amendments required to pass the resolution. This opened up the space for practicing
negotiations and diplomacy with fellow security council countries. Furthermore, the language
used throughout the simulation was extremely formal and similar to what would be expected
in the real council. All had to address each other diplomatically and respectfully; for example,
using phrases such as “fellow delegates”, “thank you chair”, and “India to respond to
Tunisia”. Although the online format of this event may not have turned out as perfectly as it
could in person; the formal language and structured timetable truly added to the real
experience of the simulation.
My group represented Norway's position on fragile states. Norway is not a part of the
P5, or permanent member states of the security council, however the country is noticeably an
influential actor (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). Our position paper outlined various
previous efforts made in aiding fragile states in all regions; therefore, we detailed our
involvement in Syria, Somalia, Israel/Palestine conflict, and general goals in fragile states.
The most fundamental stances we aligned with were open-communication, financial aid,
expanded education programmes, creating economic opportunities and overall providing aid
where needed. These policy recommendations reflect the research our group did to better
understand what efforts Norway has already made.
The negotiation theory we decided would work best was an integrative approach;
from the research conducted as a group we believed this truly represented Norway's attitude
in similar situations. Integrative negotiation theory, also known as ‘win-win’ negotiation, is
the practice of being honest and open about the interests of all parties involved (Staff, 2020).
This form of negotiation reflects Norway's open communication and flexible nature. In fact,
we used this method to negotiate with the United Kingdom in the unmoderated caucus; we
proposed to form a mutually beneficial relationship between Norway and the UK to support
our amendments and resolutions towards reducing defence funding. I felt as though the
unmoderated caucus was truly the best environment for negotiations to take place; it allowed
for us to reach a ZOPA or if needed a BATNA. ZOPA, or zone of possible agreement, is the
place where two parties are able to find common ground in terms of resolutions or
agreements (Merino, 2017). Unfortunately, our efforts in persuading the United Kingdom to
align with our views was not successful; however, this indicated one of the issues with
integrative negotiations is that not all negotiations reflect ZOPA’s but rather the need for a
BATNA. A BATNA is the best alternative to a negotiated agreement; and Norway therefore
proceeded to support the resolutions which aligned with our own similar goals.
During the UNSC simulation, we found that we aligned most with Tunisia's proposals
and goals in fragile states. In their position paper they outlined policies including promoting
peace and security in fragile states, implementing stronger cooperation and issues of mass
migration. The resolution proposed by Tunisia in the simulation highlighted reconsidering the
Palestine and Israel conflict and increasing financial support to fragile states. They also
proposed fully implementing S/RES/2334 and resolution A/73/255 in proposing the
formation of a Palestine State. From our research, as a group we knew that Norway had
already created a diplomatic mission in Tunisia by placing an embassy there recently; this
furthered our intrigue in creating relations. We found a ZOPA with Tunisia, due to similar
positions Norway has on the Israel/Palestine conflict; Norway supports the stance of
increased intervention and funding for this area and to promote peace and security within the
region. Although, we argued that Norway would not be able to fully accept all proposals
outlined, we believe that ZOPA would be useful here if certain amendments were made to the
resolution. For example, in section 5, among others, of the Tunisia proposal we fully agree
with the demand of increased financial aid and further support to Palestinian refugees.
However, the United States of America, as a permanent member, exercised its right to
veto the vote. The veto power, held only by P5, fully declines the proposal even if a majority
of countries on the security council motion to vote in favor (Security Council Report, 2015).
This response by the US, demonstrated an important limitation to the security council. The P5
may have too much power, and can simply veto any proposals or resolutions that do not favor
their own proposals. As the US has often shown to fully support Israel, this explained
possible reasoning as to why the veto was enacted. This also demonstrated how quickly a
vote can be dismissed when contradicted by permanent members. In terms of relations with
the US, we initially believed that Norway would be able to find common values and goals.
However, after reading the US position paper we found that their focus was mainly on
Afghanistan and not indicative on their stance in other regions. In a policy recommendation
the US asserts that they are open to communication with the Taliban. However, as Chatham
House claims it is unusual for democrative governments to do so (Chatham House 2019). As
Norway we agreed to no-negotiations with terrorists, therefore we voted against the US
proposal.
The US approach was a structural approach, which can also be seen as a win-lose
strategy. A structural approach can be understood as “explanations of outcomes in patterns of
relationships between parties or their goals” (Alfredson, 2008). This was seen in the UNSC
simulation when their proposal was voted against in the first caucus; to regain their power
they therefore vetoed Tunisia's proposal. The US role in the simulation offered a possible
negative outcome to structural negotiation theory; as the win-lose aspect of the negotiation
offers in some times little options for BATNA. The simulation also reflected how the US was
misrepresented in many negotiations and resolutions; as a group we believed if the focus was
less on Afghanistan, Norway likely would have found a ZOPA with the United States of
America. However, a BATNA was achievable between the US and Norway, with
amendments to some resolutions. The issue was that the lack of time, brief negotiation in the
unmoderated caucus and unclear position of the US we did not effectively negotiate with
them. Furthermore, as mentioned above when the US vetoed Tunisia's proposal it outlined a
possible unfair power dynamic between smaller states and larger ones. The proposal Tunisia
presented was one that many countries would have agreed upon; however the power dynamic
shows that powerful countries can often simply stop it without giving reasoning.
Towards the end of the UNSC simulation, the countries finally came to an agreed
upon resolution that suited most countries' recommendations. The final resolutions outlined
the need for further documentation of conflicts in the world, specifically in fragile states.
Secondly, the UNSC would need to create various subcommittees to assume responsibilities
of each conflict in fragile states. It was also proposed that all states in the UN should increase
funding in peacekeeping missions, financial aid, and humanitarian crises. Finally, to end
violence in Myanmar as a responsibility by all members of the security council. These
resolutions align with our position, Norway has always been eager to fund and provide
peacekeeping missions as outlined by our proposal. Therefore our team saw this as a success
for Norway, as many of our own policy recommendations were fulfilled through the final
resolution. An issue with this simulation was that not all countries uploaded their position
papers with enough time for our group to debate what our strategies of negotiation would be.
More time to read through the papers may have given us a better understanding of who to
negotiate with and which techniques to use. The moderated caucus ran smoothly except for a
few informal interjections by groups, which were quickly corrected. The unmoderated caucus
was an opportune time to practice how to negotiate; our group believed that with more time
we could have had increased success with countries such as the United Kingdom, the United
States of America, and India. The research part beforehand provided the opportunity to
analytically understand what a country, such as Norway, would propose or recommend when
looking at fragile states. Moreover, it also allowed for the interpretation of which negotiation
theory would work best and then how to further use that theory to create diplomatic relations
with other countries. This experience was an informative and engaging method of learning
more about the procedures and theories of negotiation needed in the UN.
References
Alfredson, T. (2008). “Negotiation Theory and Practice.” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Available at: http://www.fao.org/docs/up/easypol/550/4-5_negotiation_background_paper_179en.pdf [Accessed 24 March 2021].
Chatham House. (2019). “Negotiating with Terrorists.” Chatham House. Available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/all/members-event/negotiating-terrorists [Accessed 25 March 2021].
Merino, M. (2017). “Understanding the Zone of Possible Agreement.” Harvard Business School Online. Available at: https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/understanding-zopa [Accessed 25 March 2021]
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2020). “Norway in the UN Security Council.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/the-un/norway_unsc/id2603889/ [Accessed 23 March 2021].
Security Council Report. (2015). “The Veto.” Security Council Report. Available at: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php [Accessed 25 March 2021].
Staff, P. (2020). “Use Integrative Negotiation Strategies to Create Value at the Bargaining Table.” Harvard Law School. Available at: https://www.pon.harvard.edu/daily/negotiation-skills-daily/find-more-value-at-the-bargaining -table/ [Accessed 25 March 2021].
,
Individual Critical Reflection – France
The already concerning situation of fragile states worldwide has been further escalated due
to the multifaceted issues brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic. With just under one
hundred and twenty five million confirmed cases and two and a half million deaths globally
(World Health Organization, 2021), it is estimated that one-third of these cases and fatalities
are located in highly vulnerable countries faced with refugee and humanitarian crises
(Security Council, 2020). Fragile states have lacked resources and support during the
pandemic, generating potential long-term social, economic and political consequences.
Countries in such positions have witnessed an increase in poverty, hunger, human rights
violations, risking a decline of institutional order in newly established democratic
governments. Furthermore, vaccination programs and campaigns have been disrupted,
‘putting more than 80 million children under the age of one at risk of vaccine-preventable
diseases’ (Security Council, 2020). With this, the Security Council (SC) has, since March
2020, been working to address the concerns surrounding maintaining peace and security in
fragile states during such unprecedented times. This paper will critically analyse the
conflicting position points and negotiation tactics of the delegation of the United States,
Vietnam and India during the simulation and will further evaluate the virtual experience of the
debate as a whole.
As a representative of the delegation of France, our aim was to push delegates to commit to
the upkeep of newly-formed democracies in this time of global health crisis by calling for
further humanitarian aid support and monetary contributions towards the Global
Humanitarian Response Plan. Our position focused on the fragile status of African states
during this time, most specifically the Central African Republic (CAR) and the Republic of
Mali, countries which share intrinsic economic, political and historical ties with France.
France’s diplomatic posture throughout the debate, and further emphasised in our position
paper, was that of a comprehensive collaborative approach of international partnership
which prioritised the facilitation of peacekeeping operations by enabling them to fully
implement their mandates, despite the challenges incurred by the pandemic. Ultimately,
France’s main goal was to preserve democracy by finding a resolution that would protect
decades worth of political and economic development investment in fragile states, now at
risk of deterioration due to the pandemic.
While France greatly welcomed the grand majority of position papers presented by the
participating members of the SC, where most declared their underlying support to deal with
the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic as a matter of urgency, the debate
itself steered in a completely different direction. In a proposal put forward by the delegation
of India, the council surprisingly voted to focus the discussions solely on conflict resolution.
While France was also committed to finding a resolution related to the cessation of hostilities
and conflict, we found this topic to be not only incredibly broad for a moderated caucus but it
also conflicted with the majority of position papers and our debate expectations.
Furthermore, resolution 2532, which calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities and
armed conflicts during this moment, passed unanimously by the SC in July 2020 (United
Nations Security Council, 2020), making our discussion on conflict resolution redundant.
Although France attempted to exercise its veto power to negate the passing of this motion,
this was unfortunately overseen by the chair and the motion passed with a simple majority.
The delegation of France believed that the SC would have benefited from taking a
consequentialist approach and focusing on finding a resolution to the immediate, unresolved
matters related to the challenges on fragile states before attempting to resolve their
pre-pandemic conflicts. For example, the protection of aid workers and medical personnel in
fragile states, which France strongly advocated for, will impede the discontinuation of efforts
on poverty eradication, education, healthcare and development.
Although France and the US are well-known diplomatic partners, our approaches during this
debate were extensively different. The US holds significant relevance and power within the
decision-making body and processes of the SC. However, on this occasion, the American
position paper was incompatible with the real-life postures of US foreign policy on priorities
and measures to support peace and security in fragile states. While the new Biden-Harris
administration is currently negotiating cuts for their defence spending, which was increased
by 19% during the Trump administration (Stone, 2020), the delegation of the US took a
unilateral approach and proposed an increase of defence budgets and spending by the
member states of the SC, which would be used to support military interventions. While this
may have been an accurate posture for the US delegation to hold in a 2001 post-9/11
themed SC simulation, it did not align with the new administration’s foreign policy strategy
and with the aims of the debate overall. Furthermore, for unexplained reasons, the
delegation of the US focused their position paper solely on their bilateral relationship with the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. For a simulation of an institution that highly promotes
multilateral diplomatic practice, this decision was rather disappointing. It limited debating
capacities with the US and disrupted the group’s negotiation dynamics as a whole. Having
known the American position before the submission of the position papers, our delegation
would have pushed for a Franco-American political and economic collaboration of aid and
peacekeeping in Afghanistan. Furthermore, France, together with the other P5 member
states could have pushed the US to steer its focus of the debate toward COVID related
emergencies in fragile states.
When evaluating the theoretical basis of negotiation for some of the most involved actors of
the discussion, while the delegation of India took the lead in attempting to find a possible
zone of agreement between the SC (Merino, 2017), France and other P5 member states
rejected their proposal for states to decrease their defence budget and spending by 7.5%.
India’s integrative bargaining tactic (Weingart et al, 1987) failed to estimate the almost
obvious constraints posed by the power and influence of the P5 and their unwillingness to
allow their national policies and spending to be a matter of negotiation for the SC. On the
other hand, France was poised as a competitive negotiator committed to using its bargaining
power (O’Neill, 2018) to guarantee the inclusion of its interest in the final resolution.
‘Competitive negotiators attempt to conceal the true extent of their authority to make
compromises (…) they seek to persuade rather than discuss’ (Lowenthal, 1982).
Furthermore, while the simulation called for a systematic collaborative and multilateral
approach for a topic that raises transnational concerns, the delegations of the US and
Vietnam focused their attention on issues concerning their own national security, foreign
policies and relations. As previously mentioned, while the US focused its position solely on
solidifying its relationship with Afghanistan, Vietnam disregarded the committee topic as a
whole and proposed another, no less concerning, discussion on China’s assertive and
expansionist behaviour in the East Sea region. However, this matter was already tabled for
debate in the ASEAN 2020 summit where its leaders recalled and reiterated the UN’s
Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) to find a resolution for this dispute based on
‘sovereignty rights and entitlements’ (The Guardian, 2020). While the UK and France both
believe that China is a ‘clear and present threat to the stability of the region and the
international community’ (Meizels, 2019), this specific discussion did not fit with the purpose
of the debate.
Model United Nations (MUN) simulations are a key tool for learning IR theory and ‘doing
politics’ (Haack, 2008; 395; Asal, 2005). It presents the importance of group work and
cooperation, serving as a site of ‘collective legitimization’ where state representatives come
together to seek ‘multilateral endorsement of their positions’ (Claude Jr, 1986). As Professor
R. P. Barston (1997) explained, diplomacy is ‘an attempt to explore and reconcile conflicting
positions in order to reach an acceptable outcome’ (p.84) . All and all, the experience of
running this simulation online mimicked the real-life adaptations of global governance in this
period of isolation and social distancing. Such conditions have established a growing
demand for digital competence as a vital skill for future diplomats. Diplomacy, as we have
seen, is a site subject to constant change (Barston, 1997: 4). However, ‘traditional
diplomacy is unlikely to be abandoned’ (Purwasito and Kartinawati, 2020). As much as the
virtual simulations attempt to come close to the experiences of in-person debates, it differs
greatly due to the fact that we are unable to detect, absorb and incorporate other important
factors of negotiation, such as body language, more fluid, direct and informal negotiations
during unmoderated caucuses, and varying cultural forms of communication. Either way, it is
a highly-valuable mode of learning, a must-have experience for any student of International
Relations.
Bibliography
Asal, Victor. 2005. “Playing Games with International Relations.” International Studies Perspective 6(3): 359–373.
Barston, R.P. (1997). Modern Diplomacy (eds). Addison Wesley Longman: Boston.
Haack, Kirsten. 2008. “UN Studies and the Curriculum as Active Learning Tool.” International Studies Perspective 9(4): 395-410.
Inis L. Claude Jr, ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’, International Organization, vol. 20, no. 3 (1966), p. 370.
Lowenthal, G. T. (1982). A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy and Behaviour. University of Kansas Law Review, 31, 69-114. Available from https://heinonline-org.uow.idm.oclc.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/ ukalr31&id=73&men_tab=srchresults [Accessed on 24/03/2021].
Meizels , J. (2019). UN Security Council Debates Response to South China Sea Crisis. Yale Model United Nations, 19 January. Available from https://ymun.org/presscorpsxlv/2019/1/19/un-security-council-debates-response-to-south-chi na-sea-crisis [Accessed on 24/03/2021].
Merino, M. (2017). Understanding Zopa: The Zone of Possible Agreement. Harvard Business School Online, 14 September. Available from https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/understanding-zopa#:~:text=What%20Is%20the%20Zone% 20of,some%20of%20the%20other's%20ideas. [Accessed on 25/03/2021].
O’Neill, B. (2018). International Negotiation: Some Conceptual Developments. Annual Review of Political Science, 21, 515-533. Available from https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/full/10.1146/annurev-polisci-031416-092909 [Accessed 25/03/2021].
Purwasito, A. and Kartinawati, E. (2020). Hybrid Space and Digital Diplomacy in Global Pandemic Covid-19. Atlantis Press, 21 December. Available from https://www.atlantis-press.com/proceedings/icosaps-20/125949716 [Accessed on 23/03/2021].
Shahryarifar, S., (2016) A Defence on the Prominence of Rational Actor Model within Foreign Policy Analysis. Khazar Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19 (1).
Shaw, Carolyn M. 2010. “Designing and Using Simulations
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