10 Feb Explain how the political and social history of Myanmar affected the response after Cyclone Nargis. How did it affect their
Select ONE of the following:
1) Explain how the political and social history of Myanmar affected the response after Cyclone Nargis. How did it affect their recovery efforts? Google the current political situation of Myanmar (Coup d'état in 2021) and compare it with the situation in 2008. Use one class source and one external source for the current situation (2021).
2) Analyze the social, economic, physical and environmental vulnerabilities of Myanmar before the cyclone. How did these influence the consequences after the cyclone?
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Another-Nargis-Strikes-Every-DayPOstDisasterRecovery.pdf
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UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOfficeGAO28201229BurmaUNandU.S.AgenciesAssistedCycloneVictimsinDifficultEnvironment2CbutImprovedU.S.MonitoringNeeded.pdf
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UNEP28200929LearningfromCycloneNargis.pdf
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Welcome to disasters from shock to recovery. Last week we studied the most truths Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004. This week we're staying in the southeast Asia to explore a country of majestic natural beauty and the scene of constant political struggle. Myanmar Also known as Burma but that's another story. During the 2004 tsunami these nations suffer losses but he's was yet to be hit the hardest in 2008 by cyclin enlarges. The devastation brought by the cyclin brought unexpected challenges to foreign aid agencies negotiate with the military regime in the country is make a parentheses to understand this particular political situation. Burma is made of many ethnic groups that have indifferent times ruled the country. It was once briefly the largest empire in South East Asia In the 19th century after many words it became a British colony and only regain independence in 1948. The piece was short-lived as 1960 to mark the beginning of a military dictatorship and one of the longest ongoing civil wars in the world. By 1997 the UN and many other countries including the US Australia Canada and the European Union had imposed economic sanctions on restrictions due to constant human rights violations in the country. In response the Burmese military regime blocked or impeded activities conducted by the UN UN NGOs to provide support to suffering Burmese people an ethnic minorities who were often targeted. The Burmese people were struggling not only socially but also economically and the environment often paid the price of overexploitation an underinvestment. Cyclin nArgs struck Myanmar on this second third of May of 2008. It was a category tree cyclin at the time. Bringing wind speeds of a 124 miles per hour massive rains and almost 12 feet storm surge to the IAEA Zhao Wei Delta region. Storm surge itself kill more than a 140 thousand people and left precious agricultural land and fisheries devastated the wake of the destroy destruction. So a 100 thousand people displace 50% of the schools destroys destroyed and 70 by 75% of the health facilities render useless I love the damage observe in the coastal areas can be attributed to poverty chronic underinvestment in critical infrastructure and overexploitation of coastal resources. In response to this massive tragedy several affording nations and international institutions like the UN rushed to bring aid but were met with the same. If not Tophat restrictions to fording activities. A quick solution to this obstacle was to set tent in Bangkok Thailand and literally keeping ships anchored in because of Burma waiting for approval to entry Aid was accepted in the week following this cyclin but not fought it. 48 countries workers. Only a few are ready in-country before the cyclone could continue their operations with restrictions. Left to fend for themselves. The Burmese people help themselves in the rescue on every response efforts. But by the end of May it was a really running out of resources. By this time the pressure on the regime to provide support to the victims increase. So they started to allow the creation of the tree. Partied group To manage foreign aid into barman the group included members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Government and the UN is group work in the region until July 2010 facilitating internal mobilization fostering trust and cooperation. Done our nations like the US struggled to support the country and its people while still respecting or direct support to the government agencies. To this day there is not complete certainty that the grants provided in the aftermath did not benefit a little this sanction government entities. It was simply too complicated to follow their money while making sure all affected people receive support. They used to recovery as still to come to Burma on its people the country. So its first democratic elections in 2010. But the new government taking power in 2011 but all military few years two prominent positions. Under this new government Myanmar isn't the news. Admits accusation accusations of ethnic cleansing against religious minorities. In this climate recovery is very low five years on farm productivity crop yields and fish stocks are struggling to regain preen Argus levels. Farmers and fishermen are heavily in debt or unable to pay back. Pretty nArgs loans. The changing government allowed for people to gain legal tenure of the land they work. During the day they take their ship. All land belonged to the garment is an improvement but communities in depth find themselves having to sell their land to survive. The Burmese as you can appreciate by now real fires and they and they find ways to survive under the most difficult conditions. Some of their strategies to cope with the losses after an Argus are the following. Working longer hours and taking side jobs. Migration to bigger cities daily commuting on working for a big fishing companies. Changing agricultural practices alternating between cost efficient crops selling assets unchanging livelihoods. And finally reducing expenditure by eating less and less frequent reducing cost in social activities like weddings and funerals and skipping fertilizer an extra labor into farms. These coping strategies may help the Burmese survive current hardships but doesn't ensure the recovery in the long-term. Furthermore these practices may even exacerbate therefore Wouldn't that ability to future disasters cyclone Argus struck me alma in 2008 but the country and its people have been struggling long before. Their story is The Chronicle of the effects of national and international political decision-making and socioeconomic malpractices. It proves that disasters are not natural but the result of missed opportunities incoherent policies on human action. What do you think share your questions or comments with me on your weekly discussion more or by email. Until next time have a great week
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ANOTHER NARGIS STRIKES EVERY DAY
WWW.GFDRR.ORG
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Post-Nargis Social Impacts Monitoring Five Years On
ABOUT GFDRR The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) helps
high-risk, low-income developing countries adapt to climate change and better understand
and reduce their vulnerabilities to natural hazards. Working with over 400 community-
level, national, and international partners, GFDRR provides grant financing, on-the-ground
technical assistance helping mainstream disaster-mitigation policies into country-level
strategies, and thought leadership on disaster- and climate-resilience issues through a range
of knowledge-sharing activities. GFDRR is managed by the World Bank and funded by 25
donor partners.
The preparation of this report was supported by the Global Facility for Disaster
Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR). The report provides a practical example of the
importance of understanding and monitoring the social impacts of a natural disaster on
affected communities and highlights critical issues that may otherwise remain hidden.
Complementing the PDNA methodology, social-impacts analysis deepens post-disaster
recovery frameworks and programs. It also guides aid providers in allocating resources to
the evolving needs and priorities of affected communities and in choosing implementation
modalities that take into account local realities.
October 2008 June 2013
Photo Credits:
Photographs courtesy of Markus Kostner and Patrick Barron.
The photos on the inside covers were taken in a highly affected village in Bogale township, in October 2008 (left) and June 2013 (right). The
top photos depicts the footbridge connecting two sections of the village that makes crossing the creek still a precarious undertaking five
years after Nargis.
The bottom photos depict the primary school of the village which was destroyed by Nargis and newly constructed as a combined cyclone
shelter within two years of the cyclone.
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Social Relations and Institutions ///Social relations remained strong …///
In about three-quarters of villages, social relations were considered good or fair, including in two- thirds of the highly affected villages. Where social relations were good, the community was organized and villagers undertook collective activities, mostly socio-religious tasks and regular community works such as road renovation and pond cleaning. Where social relations were poor, villagers were divided into different groups, and communal activities occurred only within these groups. In most cases, poor social relations were a remnant of the aid effort in one way or another.
///… but the bonds were getting weaker …///
At the same time, however, villagers felt that relations were worse than before Nargis in about half of the villages, including in two-thirds of the highly affected villages. Socioeconomic challenges had a negative impact on social cohesion. Better- off families that used to sponsor religious activities before Nargis were no longer able to afford them, depriving villagers of an important venue in which to strengthen social cohesion between community members. Increased migration among villagers of working age and the need to work longer hours also left villagers with less time to socialize with their neighbors.
///… especially in heterogeneous villages///
The passing away of religious leaders during Nargis contributed to strained social relations five years on, especially in villages with both Muslims and Buddhists. This was accentuated by the fact that aid had sometimes been provided along religious lines in the immediate aftermath of the cyclone. Villagers indicated that they were dealing with each other carefully and were no longer as comfortable in engaging with each other. On the whole, however,
villagers maintained social bonds across religious groups in spite of the deterioration of relationships elsewhere in the country. Leadership played a critical role in maintaining good relations.
///The role of women and youth continued
to evolve///
With aid having largely ceased, momentum toward women’s empowerment had evolved along new tracks. While after Nargis, women had been involved in aid committees, five years on, most former female committee members had once again assumed traditional gender roles, working for the family business or farm and/or undertaking household tasks. In some cases, however, women were making inroads in broader village affairs. In two villages women were elected as ten household leaders in 2013, the first time this had happened. At the same time, SIM 4 saw a resurgence of youth engagement. There were more youth-led activities in many villages, which may have been a reflection of the recent leadership changes, which brought younger leaders to power. In addition, many previous formal and informal leaders associated with the former regime withdrew from village affairs.
///Leadership dynamics had a positive effect on
social relations in many villages///
For the most part, people responded positively to changes in formal leadership that had taken place since Nargis. Political reforms and the shift to a new government in 2011 led to village tract administrator elections in early 2013. Villagers in 26 out of the 40 sample villages chose new formal leaders, while 13 reelected their former leaders. New leaders were noticeably younger, better educated and better off economically than the old leaders. In three-quarters of the villages, people were largely satisfied with the performance of the current formal leaders; the relations between villagers and their leaders were good and neutral in 21 and 9 villages, respectively. Villagers’ perceptions of their leaders did not depend on the latter’s age.
opportunities during the rest of the year. Secondary
income sources on which laborers relied to
supplement their earnings also declined, particularly
visible with small-scale fishing but also in weaving
nipa and collecting firewood. As a result, more
laborers were migrating than had been the case prior
to or in the immediate aftermath of Nargis.
///The debt burden intensified further …///
Indebtedness was directly related to the degree of
cyclone affectedness. Villagers in over one-third of
the villages were caught in a debt trap, unable to
repay even the debts that they had owed from before
Nargis. Of the 30 highly and moderately affected
villages in the sample, only 3 moderately affected
ones did not have repayment problems. Small
farmers experienced the sharpest increase in average
indebtedness, by a factor of three. Laborers had the
least capacity to repay debt; they needed to borrow
for consumption, and were, therefore, also affected
by increases in the prices of basic necessities.
Interest rates had remained largely unchanged,
ranging from 0.75 percent to 30 percent per month.
Villagers continued to rely on different credit
sources, but their relative importance had evolved.
Loans from the Myanmar Agricultural Development
Bank (MADB) brought much-needed capital into the
Delta; they were highly desirable because of their
low interest rates. MADB loans were insufficient to
meet demand, however, and private moneylenders
and traders remained important credit sources,
including for fishermen.
///… eventually affecting the distribution of land///
Within the first two years after Nargis, many
villagers depleted their assets to manage their debt.
Over the next three years, low yields and continuing
indebtedness led to an increasing number of land
transactions. All but one of the eleven villages
with a high level of land transactions were highly
or moderately affected by Nargis, implying the
transactions were related to economic distress. Even 8 of the 18 moderately affected villages saw high or moderate levels of land transactions. Many of these transactions occurred between 2010 and 2011. With many poorer farmers selling land and a few better-off farmers buying it, a highly unequal distribution of land developed in 15 percent of the sample villages. Villagers felt that the Farmland Law would enable them to use their land as collateral or sell it at a higher price. At the same time, the law intensified existing land conflicts in several villages.
///Oftentimes, outmigration was the only viable
coping mechanism, and it has increased///
Coping strategies had not changed over the previous three years but were being used more intensively. Migration continued to increase as a coping mechanism and as a way to escape job scarcity. In 40 percent of the villages, two-thirds or more of the households had at least one member who migrated. Many migrants were between the ages of 17 and 25. Many more of them had been migrating since 2010, with nearly half of village youth migrating in some instances. They ended up in big cities like Yangon and Pathein and worked mostly in factories.
Other forms of coping had potentially negative social and health consequences, such as working even longer hours to survive and thus having less time for social interaction, reducing social expenditures, and reducing the number of meals. A crucial strategy for small and medium farmers to reduce expenditure in over three-quarters of the villages was to reduce investment in fertilizer and other farming inputs, which in turn reduced yields and even led to crop failures.
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///Tensions related to the aid effort still
lingered on///
Previously observed social tension between villagers resulting from real or perceived unequal aid distribution had largely been reversed. However, tensions were noted in 16 sample villages, half of which were highly affected villages. Since highly affected villages received more aid, they were also more prone to aid-related tension: two-thirds of all highly affected villages suffered from such tension, while less than 40 percent of moderately affected villages did. Over two-thirds of the villages with aid tension had newly elected leaders. However, the presence of tensions did not automatically translate into negative perceptions of village leaders. Villagers had negative perceptions of their leaders owing to aid in only five villages. At the same time, villagers recognized the positive effects the aid effort had had on capacity building and participation.
Recommendations and Reflections Much as was the post-Nargis aid effort, the
monitoring of social impacts in Myanmar was
undertaken at a unique time in the country’s history.
As such, SIM provided insights into village life at
a time when little was known about state-society
relations at the local level. To some degree, the
unique political circumstances determined its
particular usefulness. Then again, the social impacts
of natural disasters have rarely been studied as
thoroughly as after Nargis, and important lessons
can be drawn from such analysis.
Previous rounds of SIM assessed the post-Nargis aid
effort and the path to post-disaster recovery over
time through the eyes of affected villagers. These
SIM rounds found that, while tremendously helpful to beneficiaries, aid was not always targeted to the needs of the disaster-affected populations, often did not take a longer-term sector perspective into account, and did not focus adequately on critical actors in the value chain because they were not considered poor but were equally affected by the cyclone. SIM also pointed out that communities were not much involved in decision making about aid and that the emergency committees that aid providers set up tended to negatively affect relations between villagers and their leaders, even far beyond the period of aid delivery.
Beyond being a monitoring tool, SIM also helped enhance understanding of the dynamics that play out in disaster-affected villages over the longer term. SIM showed that major natural disasters can severely damage a community’s immune system and its ability to recover on its own, making it more prone to the negative effects of subsequent external events, whether natural, economic, or political. It found that the capacity of the survivors to recover from a major disaster depended more on how many assets they had lost to the disaster than the number of people who had died in their village. SIM pointed out that multiple factors determine recovery and that the importance of these may evolve over time and vary by location. While major disasters such as cyclones affect everyone in their path equally, they also create a new tapestry in the affected area as different communities and groups within a community recover differently. Furthermore, even when social capital is strong and contributes to recovery in the short-term, it is not immune to the effects of continuing economic deprivation. Above all, SIM underlined the fact that recovery takes a long time, and it is never linear.
As a result, SIM demonstrated that qualitative social analysis can help institutions involved in a post- disaster recovery effort understand cross-cutting issues, such as governance and social accountability;
community perceptions, including those on aid effectiveness, vulnerability, and social exclusion; and process tracing, such as on the social dynamics within communities or on how aid plays out at the village level. Social analysis, therefore, enables the aid effort to be more responsive to local realities and helps to ensure that it does not contribute to social fracture.
SECTION
01
Context
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The success of any post-disaster aid effort depends
on how programs respond to and reflect such
changing needs and dynamics. After Cyclone Nargis,
therefore, the TCG developed a comprehensive
monitoring system that aimed to inform aid
responses. One component of this was Post-Nargis
Social Impacts Monitoring (SIM). SIM aimed to
understand the changing needs and priorities of
villagers, how social relations and socioeconomic
life were evolving, and the impacts of the aid
efforts. It focused on 40 villages spread across the
Delta. By focusing on a limited set of villages, it
provided in-depth information on how village life
was changing post-Nargis and insights into how aid
responses could best help Delta communities. It
complemented the ongoing quantitative Periodic
Review assessment, which measured progress
against recovery indicators in a wider set of
affected villages.
The TCG oversaw the implementation of three
rounds of post-Nargis social impacts monitoring.
The first SIM (SIM 1) was conducted in November
2008 and assessed how the disaster and aid
responses had affected Delta communities in the
first six months after Nargis. The second SIM (SIM
2) was undertaken from May to June 2009, i.e., one
year after the cyclone. The third SIM (SIM 3) was
carried out between March and April 2010. The TCG
came to an end in July 2010.
Myanmar has been undergoing a fundamental social,
political, and economic transformation since 2010.
The dissolution of the State Peace and Development
Council in March 2011 following parliamentary
elections in November 2010, parliamentary by-
elections in April 2012, and a range of economic
reforms have not only signaled a transition to
democratic governance and a market-oriented
economy but have also profoundly affected life in
rural Myanmar. In addition, while Nargis was the
most destructive natural disaster in the country’s
recorded history, the Delta and other parts of the
country have been suffering from other natural events with adverse impacts.
The longer-term effects of major natural disasters on the daily lives of those who survived them are often not well understood. How have villages affected by Nargis recovered economically in the longer run? Has village social life returned to what it had been before the cyclone? Have villages struck by the cyclone regained their capacity to withstand the compound effects of subsequent natural shocks? What other factors have shaped a village’s path to recovery? Finding answers to these questions became the purpose of the fourth round of SIM (SIM 4) that was conducted between April and May 2013, i.e., five years after Nargis. SIM 4 revisited the same 40 villages across the eight most affected Delta townships (Annex 1) and relied primarily on in-depth qualitative fieldwork.2 It focused on taking stock of the social and economic situation in the sample villages, allowing villagers to reflect on their experiences over the five years since Nargis within a rapidly changing environment. 3
a Tripartite Core Group (TCG) to coordinate this
aid effort.
After disasters, the needs of affected communities
evolve. As immediate survival priorities recede,
disaster survivors start focusing on how to rebuild
their lives and communities. Communities develop
coping mechanisms to help them deal with the
disaster and aid effort, which can have wide-ranging
impacts on local socioeconomic structures and
social relations. At the same time, new obstacles
to recovery can emerge as different individuals
and institutions adjust their behavior in the post-
disaster environment. Resource scarcity can increase
competition or promote cooperation.
Natural disasters have profound immediate impacts.
Lives are lost; shelters are destroyed; assets are
damaged or destroyed. Those who survive may
face acute health or sanitation problems and food
or water shortages. When Cyclone Nargis hit the
Ayeyarwady Delta and southern Yangon Division
in Myanmar on 2 May 2008, it brought devastation
in its wake. An estimated 140,000 people died,
and damages and losses were estimated at around
US$ 4 billion.1 In its aftermath, scores of domestic
and international actors launched a wide-ranging
humanitarian aid effort to address immediate
emergency needs. The Government of the Union of
Myanmar, ASEAN, and the United Nations formed
Section 01
Introduction
SECTION
01 Post-Nargis Recovery as Seen through Social Impacts Monitoring
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struggling to recover. This affected those at every
point in the value chain. Moreover, Cyclone Nargis
drastically reduced the opportunities for paid work
for laborers, who faced reduced demand for their
labor from the bigger farmers and fishermen who
would normally employ them. Laborers received
food aid but less livelihood support compared to
other groups. As a result, many were facing immense
difficulties in getting by. The most recurrent theme
was an increasing debt burden. In every village
studied, villagers were worried about being able
to meet their loan repayments and having enough
money for consumption in the following year.
Cyclone Nargis had a major impact on
socioeconomic life in Delta villages. However,
despite its immense shock, social relations and
local capacity remained strong. Villagers worked
together to overcome immediate challenges,
which strengthened social relations. Communities
remained resilient and functioning. The report
concluded that if people’s livelihoods and village
economies did not begin to recover soon, there
would likely be profound longer-term impacts, such
as migration out of Delta villages and a tearing of
the social fabric. If people could not break out of
the Nargis debt trap, there was a risk of longer-term
redistribution of assets from many to a few.
///Still a mixed picture: SIM 2///
Cyclone survivors continued to prioritize aid for
livelihoods. However, a year after the cyclone, the
needs of affected communities had evolved, with
villagers also prioritizing health, education, and
small-scale community infrastructure. This reflected
a shift from emergency to longer-term recovery
priorities. As in SIM 1, aid in the form of cash or
affordable credit appeared to be more effective—and
was preferred by villagers—than in-kind assistance.
However, aid levels dropped sharply and were
too low to enable cyclone survivors to adequately
recover their livelihoods. Furthermore, aid providers
continued to make aid-related decisions, with
aid distribution more formalized through official
leaders and village emergency committees. Villagers
often lacked clear information about aid, which led
to cases of perceptions of misuse and conflict about
aid.
Socioeconomic conditions remained challenging
rand were exacerbated by the wider economic
environment. There was little overall progress with
livelihoods recovery. Farmers were unable to afford
adequate farming inputs and cultivated their land
less intensively. At the same time, there appeared
to be some progress with restarting fishing, though
less progress in the returns of fishing as a source of
livelihood. Most fishing aid provided was small-
scale fishing gear that enabled fishermen to earn a
subsistence income, rather than the kind of larger-
scale aid and capital necessary to revive the fishing
value chain. Casual laborers also continued to
struggle. The inability of big farmers to recover their
livelihood and cultivate their land as intensely as
before further reduced job opportunities for casual
labor. Furthermore, some farmers and fishermen
themselves became casual laborers, so competition
increased for the jobs that did exist. Debt levels were
still rising, and interest rates remained high. Farmers
began to lose land to moneylenders as they failed to
meet their debt payments.
Social capital was still strong overall. Young people
continued to play an active role in relief and
recovery activities, such as repairing and renovating
schools and pathways. Formal leaders played a
strong role in aid-related affairs, though the roles of
village elders in aid affairs had decreased somewhat
since SIM 1. Similarly, the role of religious leaders
had evolved, with only Christian and Muslim
religious leaders engaged in day-to-day recovery
activities. There was an increasing number of
instances where aid-related tensions weakened
social relations.
The path toward recovery has evolved over time and
differed not only by degree of cyclone affectedness,
but also by both location and type of livelihood. This
section summarizes salient findings from the initial
post-disaster social impacts analysis and the first
three rounds of SIM to provide an inter temporal
snapshot of the situation in the 40 sample villages.4
///Setting the stage: the Post-Nargis
Joint Assessment///
The Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) was
the first post-disaster assessment that included
specific analysis of the social impacts of the disaster.
Undertaken within six weeks of the cyclone, the
analysis was necessarily preliminary and tentative.
It developed a set of hypotheses on forms of social
impact that might play out in the post-Nargis
period. SIM tracked these issues over time. Field
visits during the PONJA observed a high level of
unity and social cohesion among survivors, who had
no doubt been brought together by their common
efforts to survive and rebuild. It also identified
the risks of redistributing land awayy from small-
scale farmers to those with larger holdings and
of loan-based responses that further indebting
affected villagers. Furthermore, the analysis
underlined the importance of working with informal
local institutions and local leaders. Based on this
analysis, PONJA included in its guiding principles
the need to: involve communities at all stages
in the management of rel
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